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Summary 
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in 
bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of 
payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is due to the analogy between inequity 
aversion and risk aversion. Inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics: the 
advantage of being proposer can decrease as players become more impatient. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Game theory usually assumes that players care only about their own mate-
rial payoﬀs. This hypothesis is clearly refuted by the experimental evidence
in the ultimatum and related games (see Camerer (2003) for a recent sur-
vey). Inequity aversion theories have been developed in order to account for
the stylized facts observed in the laboratory (see Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). Inequity aversion means that people are
willing to give up some material payoﬀs in order to achieve more equitable
outcomes. Inequity averse responders prefer to reject small oﬀers in the
ultimatum game, and the proposers, anticipating this, make higher oﬀers.
In this paper I examine the implications of inequity aversion for bargain-
ing games in which unanimity is not required (e. g., legislative bargaining
games) and show that it may lead to a more inequitable outcome than would
occur with selﬁsh preferences.
The leading model of legislative bargaining is due to Baron and Ferejohn
(1989). In this model, n symmetric players must divide a budget by simple
majority. Each player has an equal chance of being chosen to propose a
division of the budget. Once a proposal is made, the remaining players
vote ”yes” or ”no”; if a majority of the players supports the proposal it
is implemented and the game ends; otherwise the procedure is repeated.
This model predicts that minimal winning coalitions will form and that the
proposer will receive a disproportionate share of the proceedings. Thus, the
equilibrium of the Baron-Ferejohn model with selﬁsh preferences exhibits a
substantial amount of inequity: some players are excluded (almost half of
them if the decision rule is simple majority), and the proposer receives a
substantial share (more than half of the total payoﬀ if the decision rule is
simple majority). The advantage of the proposer increases as players become
more impatient or more risk averse.1
1Assuming that all players are equally likely to propose is not essential to the predic-
tions of the model. For example, with three risk-neutral players and a discount factor
arbitrarily close to 1, payoﬀsa r e
2
3 for the proposer and
1
3 for the coalition partner as
long as each player’s probability of being proposer is strictly between 0 and
1
2;o t h e r w i s e ,
payoﬀ division is even more unequal.
2The Baron-Ferejohn model has led to many applications and extensions.2
In its simplest form, it assumes that parties are selﬁsh, risk neutral and
only concerned with their share of cabinet posts as opposed to policy. The
predictions of the model under these assumptions have been tested by An-
solabehere et al. (2005) using data on the distribution of cabinet posts
in coalition governments in Europe. A signiﬁcant proposer advantage is
found, though this advantage is not nearly as large as the theory predicts.
Intuitively, this could be due to parties being inequity averse: if coalition
partners were prepared to reject the small share of cabinet posts predicted
by the theory, a more equitable outcome would be achieved.
A theoretical analysis of the implications of inequity aversion for the pre-
dictions of the model reveals that the most commonly used utility function,
proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), would lead to more asymmetric di-
visions. The reason is that, even though responders dislike getting less than
the proposer, they are willing to accept smaller shares in order to avoid the
risk of being excluded altogether.
Inequity aversion may also reverse the eﬀect of impatience. The equilib-
rium outcome may be so inequitable that the responders who vote in favor of
the proposal would actually prefer that all players get 0; by rejecting the pro-
posal they can temporarily enforce this outcome. As players become more
impatient, rejecting the proposal becomes more attractive and the proposer
must compensate the responders if he wants the proposal to be accepted.
Hence, impatience may work against the proposer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the bargaining procedure and its equilibrium assuming Fehr-Schmidt prefer-
ences and no discounting. Section 3 contains some extensions and discussion,
and section 4 concludes.
2For example, McKelvey and Riezman (1992) use the model to analyze seniority in
legislatures and the reelection of incumbents. Other papers incorporate policy preferences
(e.g. Baron 1991, Banks and Duggan 2000), diﬀerent risk attitudes (Harrington 1990),
general voting rules (Montero 2006) or an endogenous status quo (Kalandrakis 2004).
32 The model
2.1 Preferences
The players have Fehr-Schmidt preferences, that is, given a division x =











max(xi − xj,0) (1)
where 0 ≤ βi < n−1
n and βi ≤ αi. Assume moreover that αi = αj = α and
βi = βj = β for all i, j. Thus, players are symmetric and not too averse to
advantageous inequality.3 Preferences are complete information.
The utility function assumes that a player compares himself separately
with every other player. Notice however that it is only the total payoﬀ of
players with xj >x i and that of players with xj <x i that matters. Any
redistribution of payoﬀs inside one of those two groups does not aﬀect i’s
utility unless it changes the rank of xi.
Some implications of the utility function can be found below
Lemma 1 Let β < n−1
n .
a) Any donation makes the donor worse-oﬀ.
b) Any donation equally divided between several recipients makes all re-
cipients better-oﬀ.
Proof. a) Let i be the donor. Suppose i donates ² to another player j.
The donation has two eﬀects: it reduces i’s material payoﬀ,a n di ta ﬀects i’s
position with respect to other players. The most favorable case corresponds
to i having the highest payoﬀ both before and after the donation, so that the
donation reduces i’s disutility from advantageous inequality with respect to





which is negative if β < n−1
n . If the donation creates or exacerbates a
disadvantageous position for i, the disutility is even higher.
3If β >
n−1
n , there is no conﬂict of interest between the players: everybody’s ideal
outcome is xi =
1
n for all i.
4b) Suppose ² is divided equally between s recipients including j.T h e
donation increases j’s material payoﬀ and leaves j’s position with respect
to the other recipients unchanged. In the most unfavorable case, j suﬀers
from advantageous inequality with respect to the remaining n − s players,












is positive if β < n−1
n .
Lemma 2 Consider a lottery over distributions of material payoﬀsi nw h i c h
distribution xh occurs with probability ph. Then players weakly prefer the
sure outcome in which each player i receives
P
h phxh
i to the lottery.
Proof. Consider the situation of player i.P l a y e r i’s expected utility























The ﬁrst term in the utility function would be unaﬀected if the players
received the sure outcome. What changes is the disutility from inequality.
If all players have the same expected material payoﬀ, then it is clear that







i .T h e ni’s disutility from inequality between






























































j). It is strictly
positive if xh
i − xh
j > 0f o rs o m eh, or in general if some actual outcomes
5reverse the rank of the expected material payoﬀs. An analogous exercise
reveals that player j also prefers the sure outcome to the lottery.
Thus, inequity aversion is closely related to risk aversion.4 Player i is
strictly risk averse with respect to lotteries in which the rank of xi varies,
and risk neutral for other lotteries.
2.2 The bargaining procedure
There are n ≥ 3 identical players bargaining over how to divide a budget of
size 1; q out of n votes are needed to pass a proposal, with n
2 <q<n .E a c h
player’s utility function is given by (1).
Bargaining proceeds as follows. A player is randomly selected to be the
proposer (each player selected with probability 1
n). This player proposes a
vector x ∈ Rn,w i t hxi ≥ 0 for all i and
P
i∈N xi ≤ 1, where xi is player
i’s share of the budget. The remaining players in N accept or reject the
proposal sequentially in some predetermined order. If at least q − 1p l a y e r s
accept, the proposal is passed and x is implemented. If less than q−1p l a y e r s
accept, a new proposer is selected, again each player with probability 1
n.A l l
players discount future payoﬀsb yaf a c t o rδ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 ) .I nt h i ss e c t i o nw e
will assume no discounting, i.e. δ =1 .
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show that there is a multiplicity of subgame
perfect equilibria in this game. Because of this, they restrict the analysis to
stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE). These are subgame perfect
equilibria in which the players’ strategies do not condition on elements of
history other than the current proposal.
Using arguments parallel to those of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and
Okada (1996), it is easy to see that all SSPE have the property of immediate
agreement. Even though there is no discounting in the model, there is
pressure to reach an agreement because of the risk of being excluded. Only
minimal winning coalitions form in equilibrium, that is, n−q players receive
0. Because players are not too averse to advantageous inequality, there is
no reason to oﬀer a positive amount to more than q − 1 others. Because of
4The analogy between other-regarding preferences and risk preferences has been ex-
plored by Neilson (2006).
6a standard subgame perfection argument, the other q − 1p l a y e r sm u s tb e
indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the proposal.
Lemma 3 Any SSPE exhibits immediate agreement.
Proof. If a player makes a proposal that is not accepted, the game goes
to the next period. According to lemma 2, all players weakly prefer to agree
on getting their expected material payoﬀs rather than go to the next period.
The proposer can ﬁnd a player i with a positive expected material payoﬀ
and propose that all players get their expected material payoﬀs except for
i’s payoﬀ, which is divided equally between the proposer and q − 1 other
players. This proposal must be accepted and makes the proposer strictly
better-oﬀ.P l a y e ri can always be found unless the proposer has an expected
material payoﬀ of 1 to begin with, but this is clearly not an equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Any proposal accepted in an SSPE is such that n − q players
get 0 and q − 1 players are indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting the
proposal.
Proof. If the proposal is accepted in equilibrium, at least q players
(including of course the proposer) must weakly prefer the proposal to pass.
Equilibria in which a proposal passes just because more than q players vote
in favor and nobody is pivotal are ruled out since voting is sequential.
Let S be a set of players with exactly q members including the proposer,
all of which weakly prefer the proposal to pass. The remaining n−q players
must get 0. This is because according to lemma 1 any positive payoﬀ could
be divided equally between the players in S and make them better-oﬀ.F o r
the same reason, no money can be thrown away in equilibrium.
Analogously, q−1 players must be just indiﬀerent between the proposal
passing and failing. Suppose j ∈ S strictly prefers the proposal to pass. A
proposal with
P
k∈N xk =1a n dxj =0w o u l dg i v ej his lowest possible
utility, thus if j strictly prefers the proposal to pass it must be the case that
xj > 0. Then the proposer could reduce xj by a suﬃciently small amount
and divide this amount equally between the players in S\{j}. The proposal
would still pass and the proposer would be better-oﬀ.
7Proposition 1 In a symmetric SSPE, the proposer’s share increases in both
α and β.
Proof. Lemma 4 implies that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the proposer
oﬀers y to q − 1 other players, and 0 to the rest. In order for symmetry
of equilibrium to be preserved, each player must receive proposals with the
same probability,
q−1
n (for example, each proposer proposes to each of the
other players with equal probability). The equilibrium value of y is deter-
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This equation assumes that the equilibrium payoﬀ of the proposer, 1 −
(q − 1)y, is at least as large as the equilibrium payoﬀ of the responder, y.
This will be shown to be the case.
The solution to this equation is
y =
α +( n − 1)(1 − β)
αq(n − q +1 )+n(n − 1) − β(n2 − nq + q(q − 1))
This expression is decreasing in both α and β.T h u s ,t h em o r ei n e q u i t y
averse players are, the more inequity we observe.
When α = β = 0, we are back in the original Baron-Ferejohn model,
in which y = 1
n and the proposer’s payoﬀ is
n−(q−1)
n .S i n c ey is decreasing






n > 0. Thus, the proposer gets the highest payoﬀ as
assumed in equation (4).
Example 1 Let n =5and q =3 .T h ee q u i l i b r i u mw i t hs e l ﬁsh players gives
1
5 to two responders and 3
5 to the proposer. With α = 3
4 and β =0 ,t h e
responders only get about 0.18;f o rα = 3
4 and β = 1
2 they get about 0.15.I n
the limit when α tends to inﬁnity, the responders get only 1
9 ≈ 0.11.
8The reason for this counterintuitive result is that responders dislike the
fact that the proposer is getting more than them, but they also dislike the
possibility of being left out altogether if they reject the proposal. It turns
out that the second eﬀect is stronger, so that players are willing to settle for
less rather than endure the possibility of being excluded in the future.
The analogy between inequity aversion and risk aversion plays an im-
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1 − (q − 1)y − β
µ














Thus, the equilibrium oﬀer must make the responders indiﬀerent between
the proposal and a lottery in which there is a probability 1
n−q+1 of becoming
the proposer and a probability
n−q
n−q+1 of being excluded from the coalition.
For y = 1
n, the sure outcome and the lottery yield the same expected
material payoﬀ to player i. Note that the expected utility on the right-
hand side for player i does not correspond to a unique lottery: the payoﬀs
f o rp l a y e r so t h e rt h a ni are not completely determined. A lottery with this
expected utility is the following: i is selected to be proposer with probability
1
n−q+1 and gives y to q − 1 players (including j), and j is selected with
probability
n−q
(n−q+1) and gets the whole payoﬀ. Because of lemma 2, player i
strictly prefers every player to receive his expected material payoﬀ for sure.
The expected material outcome of the lottery is such that i gets 1





n, and player j gets the remaining payoﬀ.I fq>2,
the utility on the left-hand side of (5) is obtained by a transfer from j to the
q − 2 players. This reduces i’s disadvantageous inequality with respect to j
as well as the advantageous inequality with respect to the q−2p l a y e r s ,a n d
leaves i’s position with respect to n−q players unchanged, making i strictly
better-oﬀ.T h u s , y = 1
n cannot be an equilibrium because the responders
would strictly prefer the proposal to pass, and the proposer could cut their
9payoﬀs.
In this reasoning it is important that i doesn’t care about the distri-
bution of the payoﬀ between the other players when he is excluded from
the coalition. In the lottery that actually corresponds to the equilibrium
strategies player j’s expected material payoﬀ is lower than 1 − (q − 1)y.
There is a diﬀerence between the eﬀect of α and the eﬀect of β.T h e
eﬀect of α is perverse because of the risk of being excluded from the coalition;
the perverse eﬀect of β exists regardless of whether there is a risk of being
excluded. Indeed it is already present in two-player bargaining.
Consider the eﬀect of an increase in β in two-player bargaining. Because
the proposer gets more than the responder, the increase in β has no eﬀect
on the attractiveness of a given share y for the responder. On the other
hand, if the responder rejects y, he will be the proposer next period with
probability 1
2 and will suﬀer from advantageous inequality. Since accepting
the proposal is equally attractive and rejecting it has become less attractive,
the proposer can cut the responder’s payoﬀ. This seems paradoxical: the
proposer can exploit the responder precisely because the responder would
suﬀer from advantageous inequality if he rejected the proposal and happened
to be selected as proposer in the next period.
Without unanimity the eﬀect of an increase in β is not straightforward.
Ag i v e ns h a r ey is now less attractive, since the responder suﬀers from the
advantageous inequality with respect to the players who are excluded. On
the other hand, rejecting the proposal is also less attractive since player i
will suﬀer from the advantageous inequality with respect to all other players
as a proposer, and with respect to the excluded players as a responder. The
second eﬀect predominates for small enough values of y (y< n−1
n2−nq+q(q−1),
an inequality that is satisﬁed by y = 1
n).
3 Extensions and discussion
3.1 The eﬀect of discounting
Proposition 1 holds for suﬃciently high values of δ.H o w e v e r ,t h ev a l u eo f
y is increasing in both α and β for suﬃciently low values of δ.I ti se a s yt o
10see why by focusing on δ =0 .F o rδ = 0, what happens in the next period
is irrelevant and players compare the proposal to the outcome in which all
players receive 0. A given value of y becomes less attractive as α and β
increase, and responders must be compensated for this.
Proposition 2 Let δ ≤ 1. In a symmetric SSPE, the proposer’s share
increases in both α and β if δ is suﬃciently large. It decreases in both α and
β if δ is suﬃciently small.
Proof. The equilibrium value of y is
y =
α(n − δ(n − 1)) + δ(n − 1)(1 − β)






dβ are decreasing in δ for any δ ≤ 1. Moreover, they are
positive for δ = 0 and negative for δ =1 .
We now turn to the eﬀect of a change in the discount factor holding
other things constant. With selﬁsh players, discounting always increases the
advantage of the proposer. With inequity averse players the opposite can
happen. This is because the responder may prefer the outcome in which
all players get 0 to the equilibrium proposal. The responder nevertheless
accepts the proposal because he cannot enforce the outcome in which all
players get 0. However, if discounting is introduced, the responders enforce
the situation in which everybody gets 0 for one period, and thus they would
prefer to reject the proposal. Thus, if the equilibrium value of y for δ =1i s
preferred to all players getting 0, discounting works in favor of the proposer;
if it is not preferred, discounting works in favor of the responders. For some
parameters, the equilibrium value of y may be above 1
n: for example, if
n =3 ,q =2 ,δ =0 .5, α =7a n dβ =0 .5, the equilibrium value of y is about
0.37 > 1
3.
Proposition 3 Let δ ≤ 1. In a symmetric SSPE, the proposer’s share is
decreasing in δ provided that the responders prefer the equilibrium proposal
to the outcome in which all players get 0.
Proof. Taking the equilibrium value in (6), one can calculate
dy
dδ as well
as the utility of the responder when he accepts the equilibrium proposal
11corresponding to δ = 1. Both expressions are the product of a negative
term and the term
q(n − q)α2 +( n − q − 1)[n − 1 − β(n − q)]α − (n − 1)(1 − β)(n − 1 − β(n − q)).
(7)
Therefore, both expressions must have the same sign. In particular,
both expressions are negative for high values of α. Looking at the signs of
the coeﬃcients in equation (7) we see that it must have a positive and a
negative root. The negative root is not relevant since α is constrained to be
nonnegative. Because the coeﬃcients of α2 and α are positive, (7) must be
positive for values of α above the positive root.
3.2 Alternative preferences
As shown in section 2.2, payoﬀ division can be more inequitable under in-
equity aversion than under selﬁsh preferences. This result is obtained under
a concrete functional form, namely the one postulated by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). In this section we show that this result can also be found with non-
linear functional forms as well as for Bolton-Ockenfels (2000) preferences.
Keeping the assumption of symmetry and ﬁxing the number of players,




c(xj − xi)( 8 )
where u(xi)i si’s utility for money and c(xj − xi)i si’s disutility from
inequality (see Neilson, 2006).
Example 2 Suppose n =3and q =2 . Each player’s utility function is given
by (8), with c(xj−xi)=0for xj ≤ xi (players are averse to disadvantageous
inequality and neutral to advantageous inequality). Let u0 > 0, u00 ≤ 0 and
c0 > 0 for xj >x i. Any symmetric SSPE has y<1
3.
Following the reasoning in section 2.2, it is easy to see that if there is
an SSPE it must entail immediate agreement. Moreover, since players are
not averse to advantageous inequality there is no reason for the proposer to
12oﬀer a positive payoﬀ to more than one player. In a symmetric equilibrium,
the value of y is determined by the following equation:
u(y) − c(1 − 2y)=
1
2




If we compare the right-hand side with the left-hand side for y = 1
3,w e
see that for y ≥ 1




3). Thus it is suﬃcient to show that c(1−y)+c(y)−2c(1−2y) > 0
for y = 1
3. This is the case because c(1 − y) − c(1 − 2y) > 0f o ra l ly>0
and c(y) − c(1 − 2y) ≥ 0f o ry ≥ 1
3. Thus, if there is an SSPE, it must have
y<1
3. For example, if c(z)=z2 for z ≥ 0, y ≈ 0.27.
The same result can be obtained with Bolton-Ockenfels preferences. A
player’s utility function has two arguments: material payoﬀ, xi,a n dr e l a t i v e
material payoﬀ, σi = xi P
j xj.F o r a g i v e n σi, the utility function is weakly
increasing in xi.F o r a g i v e n xi,i ti sc o n c a v ei nσi with a maximum at
σi = 1






agreement is reached with certainty, total payoﬀs always add up to 1 and





¢2.I fb is small (b ≤ n
n−1),
ui is increasing in xi for any xi < 1. In a symmetric equilibrium, the
proposer still wants to exploit his position and oﬀer y to q − 1p l a y e r sa n d
0t on − q players, and an equation analogous to (5) can be obtained. It
follows that y<1
n in equilibrium. This is because, if y = 1
n,b o t hs i d e s
of the equation would have the same expected material payoﬀs, but on the
left hand side σi = 1
n for sure, whereas the right hand side would contain a
lottery. More generally, the result obtains if the utility function is separable
into U(xi,σi)=u(xi) − c(σi)w i t hu00 ≤ 0, c00 ≥ 0, and any payoﬀ transfer
makes the donor worse-oﬀ and the recipient better-oﬀ. 5
3.3 Experimental evidence
The theoretical analysis shows that inequity aversion may have two per-
verse eﬀects: more inequitable payoﬀ division inside the coalition, and (for
5The payoﬀ transfers mentioned in lemmas 3 and 4 can be made from player i to the
proposer without aﬀecting any other player’s utility. Lemma 2 would hold because of
concavity of the utility function with respect to σi.
13relatively extreme preferences) the advantage of the proposer being reduced
as players become more impatient. While these are interesting theoretical
possibilities, none of these two eﬀects have been observed so far in exper-
iments on the Baron-Ferejohn model. Fr´ echette et al. (2003) report that
subjects reject very small oﬀers, and payoﬀ division is more egalitarian than
predicted by the SSPE with selﬁsh players. Fr´ echette et al. (2005) report
that discounting increases the proposer’s advantage. This may be due to
subjects using rules of thumb rather than playing SSPE, or to the respon-
ders wanting to punish the proposer for unkind oﬀers (see Kagel and Wolfe
(2001) and Falk et al. (2003) in the context of the ultimatum game).
Okada and Riedl (2005) investigate a three-player game in which a player
is randomly selected to make an oﬀer to either one or both of the other play-
ers, and the game ends if the proposal is rejected. The three-player coalition
has a higher total payoﬀ but a much lower per capita payoﬀ. The Fehr-
Schmidt and Bolton-Ockenfels models predict that the two-player coalition
will form and the responder will get signiﬁcantly more than 0; Okada and
Riedl’s ﬁndings are consistent with this prediction. The theory does not
predict counterintuitive eﬀects of inequity aversion in this case because the
game assumes away the risk of being left out of the coalition that forms:
players can be sure that everybody will get 0 if they reject the proposal.
4 Concluding remarks
It is well known that introducing competition in bargaining may make play-
ers behave as if they were selﬁsh even if many of them are inequity averse
(see Roth et al. (1991) for experimental evidence on the ultimatum game
with proposer competition, Fischbacher et al. (2003) for responder compe-
tition, and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) for
a theoretical analysis). Also, Bolton and Ockenfels (1998) and Okada and
Riedl (2005) show that inequity aversion is compatible with excluding one
player from the coalition that forms. This paper goes a step further: not only
inequity aversion is compatible with one player being excluded but it may
actually lead to more inequitable divisions inside the coalition that forms.
14The fact that players dislike getting less than others does not trigger rejec-
tion of unfair proposals; on the contrary, players are more willing to accept
such proposals rather than risk being left out altogether. A psychologically
plausible assumption (inequity aversion) may lead to a psychologically im-
plausible result (individuals being more willing to accept unfair proposals).
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